

Epistemic Virtues in Robinson & Chick


(the pragmatist post-Keynesians)

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Formalism

Formalism, logic and reality: a Keynesian analysis
Reprinted as “The Non-neutrality of Formalism” (2012) in
S.Dow Foundations for new economic thinking



Peirce, C.S.

1878 *Deduction,
Induction and
Hypothesis*

1903
*Pragmatism as
the Logic of
Abduction*

Foundationalism

Victoria Chick and Jesper Jespersen 2023

“Holism and the Fallacy of Composition in Macroeconomics”
Routledge Handbook of Macroeconomic Methodology


Two readings of the
microfoundations debate

1. Ontological

“Regulative assumptions”

2. Epistemological

Coherence? Or fudge???



Abstraction

S. Dow and V. Chick (2011) “The Meaning of Open Systems”
reprinted 2012 in S. Dow ***Foundations for new economic thinking***

Victoria Chick (2023) “Open and closed systems”
Routledge Handbook of Macroeconomic Methodology

- Chick and Dow seek to answer how they can simultaneously: agree with Lawson’s depictions of “social reality” as being open
- Whilst also maintaining the acceptability of using “closed” methods
- Chick’s conclusion: don’t actually agree with Lawson – *“talking at cross-purposes because the meaning of words not clear”*

Boundaries, Nesting

Chick (2023) “We are back to the question of judgement: what is harmless abstraction and what is a distortion?”



Judgement

Beliefs are about the “*establishment of a habit of positive expectation*” Peirce 1878


Fallibilism – any belief or method could turn out to be flawed

The pragmatist tradition is “tied to the study of **normative standards** we should adopt when carrying out inquiries”

Legg and Hookway 2020, *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*

Epistemic virtues

- Robinson and Falsificationism: “knocking out errors”
- Peirce 1877 The Fixation of Belief *“to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous”*
- Epistemic virtues
 - Pluralism as an epistemic virtue
 - Decolonisation – overcoming epistemic injustice (Miranda Fricker)



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Cheryl Misak 2016

Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein

Hasok Chang 2022

Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatist Philosophy of Science

H. Battaly (ed.) 2019

The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology

Appetite from
more?